SUMMARY
pharmacology, etc. continue to be very active research areas".
Another similarity is that both are faced from time to time with rapidly evolving crises of a complexity which requires cognitive tasking that is beyond the information-processing capacity of the human brain. 2 Also, they both operate "tightly coupled" systems (i.e. ones in which one false move may have an immediate and catastrophic consequence, where the cause-effect relationship is obvious). The problem may be further compounded by valuable cognitive processing capacity being directed towards worrying about the sequelae of an impending disaster.
It is well recognised by aviation psychologists that the best strategy in such a situation is to default to a well-learned and frequently practised routine which has been designed to render the system safe while diagnostic and corrective measures can be implemented. 3 Much effort is expended in refining and simplifying these "immediate response" or "phase I" algorithms, as, even with the mandatory 3-monthly testing required for airline pilots, such skills degrade rapidly if they are complex. The new Boeing 747 aircraft have only 7 "phase I" sequences, whereas the original "classic" B747 had 36. It is curious that the only such algorithm widely used in clinical medicine is the "cardiopulmonary resuscitation" routine, which is well down the disaster path.
One reason seems to be that, because of the encyclopaedic body of knowledge doctors are expected to be familiar with, they are encouraged to think and problem-solve from first principles. This does allow the occasional diagnostic triumph with respect to some rare syndrome, but it also causes some to reject the notion that there are aspects of medical practice that can and should consist of "rote-learned" routines.
All too often medical emergencies are either chaotic and noisy or are characterised by a superficially calm, relaxed but ineffective approach while the problem relentlessly progresses. Cognitive strategies which are of great benefit when all is going well can be maladaptive in a crisis. 4 Examples of these are: "frequency gambling' ~tending to default to familiar, previously successful but now inappropriate strategies; "coning of attention' ~preoccupation with a small, often relatively unimportant part of the problem; "confirmation bias'~clinging tenaciously to an early "strong but wrong" diagnosis by rejecting a mounting body of evidence demanding a new hypothesis ("mindset"). 4.5 It was therefore decided in 1988 5 to try to develop a better approach to crisis management in anaesthesia; the first step was to hold a "workshop".
BACKGROUND
A two-day workshop was held in Ballarat in November, 1988, and was attended by 60 anaesthetists and representatives of the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI). Six "familiar" anaesthesia crises were selected and two experienced anaesthetists were asked to prepare and present a crisis management algorithm for each (Table 1) ; each was unaware that the other had the same task. These were presented at the meeting; the presentations precipitated intense debate, with the exchange of many strongly held views. An almost complete lack of consensus, and the fact that no widely accepted algorithms existed for common, dangerous situations, led the aviation psychologists at the meeting to embark on a program of healthy living, while the presentation of several aviation crisis videos resulted in the revision of the travel plans of several anaesthetists. In view of the diverse opinions expressed, it was felt that it would be premature to proceed with the plan of publishing a paper arising from this meeting. Instead, this material was periodically reviewed while a "watching brief" was kept on the steadily mounting file of incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). 6 
TABLE I Algorithms presented at the Bal/arat Crisis Management Workshop
"I can't ventilate the patient" "I can't get a blood pressure" "I can't see the larynx" "The blood is a bit blue down here" "The pulse feels fast and irregular" "The patient won't stop bleeding"
It was clear from these AIMS reports that certain incidents had prolonged courses or bad outcomes because of inadequate crisis management; this observation was supported by the demonstration that even experienced anaesthetists often performed badly in simulated crises. 79 At this stage, two schools of thought prevailed. One held that specific crisismanagement algorithms should be developed based on "pattern recognition" of which type of crisis was evolving; in contrast, the authors felt that the risk of choosing a "wrong" algorithm was too great and that a "core algorithm" suitable for the initial response to any crisis should be developed in an objective a manner as possible in an attempt to "secure the system" before branching into "sub-algorithms".
A one-day workshop was held in Sydney in May 1991 at which it was decided to concentrate on algorithms for use in the operating theatre when an anaesthetk machine was in use; about 100 anaesthetists and representatives from BASI attended. A "core" algorithm--':'COVER ABCD, A SWIFT CHECK" (COVER)-devised by one of the authors (WBR) for the general problem "something is wrong", was evaluated and presented, while other participants presented updated algorithms for specific situations (Table 2).   TABLE 2 Algorithms presented at the Sydney Crisis Management Workshop "Something is wrong" "\ can't ventilate the patient" "I can't feel a pulse" "The blood is blue"
The topics again engendered intense debate. While it was apparent that the COVER algorithm was powerful, and was satisfactory for the initial management of most problems, there were several criticisms. 1. Some felt that it was too complex to remember and that practising anaesthetists would resist its adoption. 2. Some felt it would be impractical to invoke it whenever there was a problem. 3. Some still felt that there was no place for a "core algorithm" and that crisis-specific algorithms should be developed. 4 . Some felt that the algorithm should be subjected to further evaluation. A second phase was entered into of reviewing the literature, keeping a watching brief on accumulating AIMS reports and discussing possible solutions to the problems listed above. The COVER algorithm was presented at a meeting in Monterey, California, in February 1991 on "Human Error in Anaesthesia" sponsored by the FDA (USA) and the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation (USA) and obtained the general approval of some experienced psychologists and human performance experts. 10 Finally, it was decided to re-evaluate COVER in the light of the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS in as objective a manner as possible, to present the findings for discussion and review at yet another meeting and to proceed to publication if there was consensus at this meeting that COVER was appropriate as a "core" algorithm. This meeting was held in October 1992 in Adelaide and was funded by the Professional Indemnity Review of the Department of Health, Housing and Social Security of the Federal Government of Australia; about 100 anaesthetists and some representatives of other medical specialities attended.
THE CORE ALGORITHM
The idea of a "core algorithm" is that one can revert to it when one becomes aware that something is wrong, without being sure what the problem is. COVER has no intrinsic logic but is designed to deal with very dangerous situations early on (e.g., cardiac arrest, hypoxic gas mixture) before proceeding to some "highyield" components (e.g. circuit disconnection, kinking of endotracheal tube) so that common problems are diagnosed and corrected as rapidly as possible while the system is being rendered "safe". It is designed for use when a patient's airway is connected via a breathing circuit to gases supplied from an anaesthetic machine. If the patient does not have an endotracheal tube in place, the airway and breathing ("A", "B") should be checked at the same time or immediately after assessment of the circulation and saturation ("Cl", "C2") ( Table 3 ). These should be attended to if there are any problems and assistance should be sought as at least one person is required to manage these while the rest of the algorithm is gone through. Thus, for a patient breathing on a mask, the algorithm reads AB COVER ABCD.
The algorithm is based on the mnemonic' 'COVER ABCD, A SWIFT CHECK". Each of the letters constitutes a reminder to do two things. Only the "COVER ABCD" component should be remem- bered-the steps required are listed in sequence in Table 3 .
"A SWIFT CHECK" calls for exactly what it says and also forms the basis for a written checklist. It calls for a swift check during the normal 5 minute "scan" of the surgeons', assistants', nurses' and orderlies' activities and of the operative site, a quick consideration of the pattern of physiological change revealed by the monitors and a mental review of the patient's history and preoperative status.
If there is a problem that has not been corrected at this stage, the anaesthetist will have been directed, during the ABCD review, to one of the "sub-algorithms" listed in Table 4 . However, before proceeding systematically through one or more of these, it may pay to glance at the written checklist for which "A SWIFT CHECK" forms a mnemonic, as the vast majority of outstanding problems which require swift diagnosis and/or management or which may masquerade as other problems are covered by it (see Table 5 ). Virtually all these problems occurred in the first 2000 AIMS incidents and many need brief but specific consideration if they are not to be "missed". Some may initially manifest as hypotension and hypocarbia (e.g. gas embolism, anaphylaxis, sepsis, massive myocardial infarction), and others as marked sympathetic activity (awareness, surgical stimulation, full bladder, hypoglycaemia, phaeochromocytoma). However, it is vital to remember that anaesthesia, other drugs (e.g. beta blockers, antihypertensives) and some diseases (e.g. diabetes) may mask signs and blunt homeostatic responses, and that conditions may present atypically. Thus, the possibility of these problems should always be considered on the rare occasions when the diagnosis remains obscure.
METHODS FOR VALIDATION OF "COVER"
The first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS were studied. AIMS involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. Details of the AIMS methods are provided elsewhere in this symposium. 6 Those incidents which had occurred in association with general anaesthesia and were deemed "applicable" to this study (see below for definitions and criteria) were analysed to determine whether the algorithm would have performed better than the anaesthetist reporting the incident had actually performed, to determine at which stage of the algorithm a functional diagnosis would have been made, and to determine at which stage the condition would have been corrected (from the perspective of patient safety) or have led into one of several designated "sub-algorithms". Twelve 2 hour meetings were held to develop a set of conventions and rules; these were evolved by consensus at each meeting after each author had analysed, scored and discussed a set of 50 incidents which had been handed out at the previous meeting. An attempt was made to describe these sufficiently explicitly to allow similar analyses to be undertaken by other groups. A standard format for "scoring" each incident was agreed upon (Figure 1) .
Two hundred randomly chosen incidents from the first 2000 AIMS incidents were allocated to each of 3 authors by a fourth author as a means of checking on the level of agreement between them. The remaining 1800 incidents were then randomly allocated to these 3 authors. Each section of the scoring form (Figure 1 ) was completed for each incident allocated to each of the authors according to the rules and conventions given below; assessors were not aware of the identity of the 200 "common" incidents. The first 1500 incidents (including 142 "common" incidents from the 200) were analysed in this way. The last 500 were shared between two assessors due to the unavoidable absence of the third.
Incident Descriptors (Figure 1 ) Number. Each AIMS report had been allocated a number in the order in which it was received. 30 If only one incident was recorded in the report, the report number became the number of the incident, with the suffix "a". If more than one incident was recorded in the report, a new report form had been generated for each additional incident (with the relevant details) with the same number but suffixes "b", "c" and so on. (See incidents la and lb in Figure 1. ) Applicability (AINA). An incident was considered applicable for this study if it was considered that, had it been allowed to evolve, it might require an algorithm for its resolution-i.e., if it manifested as a physiological change or if it had the potential to cause a significant physiological change in a patient breathing gas from an anaesthetic machine immediately before, during or after general anaesthesia (see incidents la, V'D ... Ib, 3a and 4a in Figure I ). Incidents were considered "non-applicable" (NA) (see incidents 2a and 5a in Figure I ) if: the incident involved local or regional anaesthesia (if a regional block was followed by a general anaesthetic the incident was only considered if it involved the general anaesthetic); the incident was obvious (e.g. the operating table collapsed or the anaesthetist was unable to intubate the patient); it was not amenable to handling by the crisis management algorithm (e.g. no blood had been cross-matched or the wrong patient presented for operation); an equipment problem was detected before induction of anaesthesia which did not have the potential to cause a physiological change later on; the incident took place during or after transfer of the patient to the recovery ward from the operating theatre; the incident occurred during a general anaesthetic outside a conventional operating theatre environment while not using an anaesthetic machine (e.g. during electroconvulsive therapy or cardioversion in a ward). In contrast to the paper in this symposium on the role of monitors, 30 failure of equipment during an anaesthetic which did not affect the patient's physiology, nor have the potential do so (e.g., monitor failure) and incidents involving a wrong drug or syringe swap, were included in this study if they manifested as, caused, or had the potential to cause, a physiological change. Flag. A tick was placed in this space if the incident was considered to be particularly interesting or atypical or to provide useful information for teaching purposes (see incident 2a in Figure 1 ). These incidents will be the subject of a future publication.
Paper. A number corresponding to each paper in this symposium was entered in this space if the incident was considered to be relevant to that paper.
Scoring of "COVER ABCD"
Effective (AL/AN). If the assessor considered that a diagnosis and/or correction would definitely have been achieved more quickly or more effectively using the algorithm than as described by the anaesthetist in the report, AL was entered in this space. If the anaesthetist performed perfectly adequately, then AN was entered in this space. If the algorithm could have led to a significant delay, or could have harmed the patient, UN was entered.
Diagnosis. The stage (i.e. letter of the algorithmsee Table 3 ) at which the nature of the problem would have been diagnosed, had the incident been allowed to evolve, was entered in this space (see incidents la, Ib, 3a and 4a in Figure I) . A "diagnosis" was considered to have been made if the general nature of the pattern was identified (e.g. circuit leak); the cause of the problem did not need to have been established (e.g. a leak at the common gas outlet).
Correction. The stage (Le. letter of the algorithmsee Table 3 ) of the algorithm at which the problem would have been corrected, had the incident been allowed to evolve, was then entered into this space. A "correction" was considered to have been made if the situation was rendered safe from the perspective of the patient. Thus, adequate ventilation of the lungs constitutes a "correction"; the specific cause of the problem need not have been corrected (e.g. mechanical failure of a ventilator). If the "correction" was achieved by a diagnosis arising from a review of monitors (i.e. from RI) or involved a process arising out of A, B, Cor D then the appropriate sub-algorithm that would be invoked was entered into this space.
Sub-algorithm. A list of these sub-algorithms is presented in Table 5 .
Conventions. It became apparent that many situations occurred repeatedly and that it would be necessary only to identify the situation and agree to a "convention'!-Le. at which stages of the algorithm a diagnosis and correction would be achieved, or a particular sub-algorithm invoked-and enter the code for that convention on the form (see incidents la, Ib, and 3a in Figure 1 ). This permitted the diagnosis, correction and sub-algorithm scores for each of these conventions to be automatically entered by manipulating the database. The set of conventions was gradually expanded to that presented in Table 6 . This was done empirically, as the need arose, and not according to any pre-determined plan. Once most of the conventions had been agreed upon, they were arranged into the functional groups shown in Table 6 ; this was done when it was realized by the only reviewer common to this study and the one on the role of monitors,30 that the empirically generated sets of clinical situations for the two studies were virtually identical (see Table 6 here and Table 2 , p. 533).30 If no convention was considered appropriate, each such incident was individually scored on the form (see incident 4a in Figure 1) .
Check. If an assessor could not decipher the handwriting on a report with certainty, or was uncertain about a rule or convention, "C" (for check) was entered in this space so that this could be discussed with the other assessors at the next meeting (see incidents Ib and 3a in Figure I) .
Editing of Individual Scores. Once a group of incidents had been scored, a series of meetings was held. At each meeting, if "C" had been recorded the assessor was able to request clarification of any aspect of the rules before finalising his or her score for that particular incident. The opportunity was used at this stage to progressively make the wording of the rules more explicit. If the group consensus was that the original score for such an incident was correct, the "C" was left in the space to indicate that the score for this incident had been checked by the group (see incident Ib in Figure 1) . If the group disagreed with any aspect of the assessor's score for this incident, this was ringed, the correct code was inserted, and "X" or "Y" was noted within the ring (see incident 3a in Figure 1 ). An "X" error was recorded if the error was due to failure on the part of the assessor to accurately read the incident or to correctly interpret the rules. A "Y" error was recorded if the assessor had interpreted the incident differently to the rest of the group (see incident 3a in Figure 1 ). After each member of the group had discussed their incidents marked "C", the numbers of those incidents common to all members of the group were revealed by the fourth author who had conducted the randomization and was not an assessor, and the scores for these were jointly checked. If there was any disagreement,. consensus was reached and an "X" or "Y" error recorded as necessary for each incorrectly scored category. At the end of the meeting the data forms were collected for entry into a database.
Data Entry. One of the authors (RKW) checked each form for completeness and consistency. If any category had not been scored the original report was checked, the matter was discussed with the relevant assessor, and the correct score was entered into the form. Those omissions that did occur were inadvertent. The data from the forms were then transferred to a centralized computer database. FoxPror\l (Fox Software Inc., Perrysburg, Ohio, USA), a proprietary database program, was used for data entry, storage, manipulation and retrieval.
RESULTS
Number. The 2000th incident was incident 1901a, indicating that 99 incidents were supernumerary on an original report form. In 73 cases there were 2 incidents on a form, in 10 cases there were 3, and in 2 cases there were 4. 1301 (65(},7o) of incidents were considered "applicable" to this study. 207 incidents were "flagged" and will be considered in a future publication.
Effective. It was considered that "COVER ABCD" would, in 164 of the 1301 incidents (I in 8, or 12.6(},7o), have diagnosed, corrected or led to an appropriate subalgorithm more quickly and/or more efficiently than the sequence described by the anaesthetist. It was considered that using the algorithm would not have harmed any of the patients, although there was some debate about cases of tension pneumothorax (see discussion). In 4 cases it could not be determined whether COVER would have been effective or not because no cause was determined for the problem by the reporter at the time of filling in the AIMS form (e.g. persistent undiagnosed desaturation). Hence, the efficacy of COVER could not be assessed.
Diagnosis. The cumulative success of COVER at reaching a functional diagnosis is shown in Figure 2 . By stage R2, a functional diagnosis had been made in just over 60(},7o of incidents and, by the end of D, in over 99(},7o of incidents. For A, Band C the "diagnosis" may have been specific (e.g. anaphylaxis, laryngospasm) or quite non-specific (e.g. cardiac arrest). Four incidents (0.3(},7o) remaining after D could not be assessed. Table 3 ).
Correction. The cumulative success of COVER at achieving correction of the problem from the perspective of the immediate safety of the patient is shown in Figure 3 . By stage R2, 765 (59(},7o) of the incidents had been corrected, and by the end of D, 62(},7o. Table 3 ).
* SA = sub-algorithms Sub-algorithms. In a further 481 incidents (37070) the anaesthetist would have been directed to one of the subalgorithms in Table 4 . In 10 no correction was possible and in 4 the incident could not be assessed. For some sub-algorithms and for D, correction might have been achieved immediately (e.g. at D by giving atropine for a suxamethonium-induced bradycardia or at A by relieving laryngospasm), but quite frequently the anaesthetist would have had to proceed to organize the treatment for a condition such as pulmonary oedema. "Correction" did not necessarily imply a successful outcome, but that the correct course of action would have been taken.
Conventions. The clinical situations that were encountered in the 1301 incidents are listed in Table 6 , together with the number of times each one was encountered, the number of times it was considered that the algorithm' 'did better" than the anaesthetist, the stages of COVER ABCD at which diagnosis and correction would have been made (if any) and the subalgorithms the anaesthetist would have been directed to.
Errors. The unavoidable absence of one of the assessors led to only 142 randomly selected "common" incidents in the first 1500 incidents being scored by all 3 assessors. Among these 142 incidents each assessed by the 3 assessors, there were 82 "X" errors (representing 3% of the 2556 categories scored) and 53 "Y" errors (representing 2 % of the 2556 categories scored). Thus there was, on average, disagreement by one of the assessors in one of the scoring categories in about 4% of incidents. Unfortunately, it was not possible to apportion the X and Y errors to each category with accuracy as some assessors failed to indicate the category in which the error had been made on the data forms. This deficiency will be addressed in future studies. There are over 1000 further AIMS reports which have been received but which have not yet been subjected to analysis.
DISCUSSION
It was considered that a functional "diagnosis" (from the perspective of rendering the patient safe) would have been made in just over 60% of the incidents by the time the R2 stage of COVER had been completed, and that the general nature of the airway, breathing, circulation or "drug" problem would have been determined in 99% of cases by the time COVER ABCD had been completed. It was assumed that certain "patterns" would be recognised to achieve this level of success (e.g. low end-tidal carbon dioxide and hypotension at R2 in certain situations should be treated as gas embolism; 22 simultaneous hypotension and bronchospasm should be treated as anaphylaxis). 19 
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It was considered that the 5 cases of awareness and the 6 of pneumothorax 18 (including 1 tension pneumothorax) applicable to this study would not have been diagnosed. Tension pneumothorax was a condition about which there was considerable debate among the assessors, as it can be argued that hand-ventilating a patient with a tension pneumothorax may be harmful. Nevertheless hand-ventilating, while carefully inspecting, observing and examining the chest, may be necessary to diagnose a tension pneumothorax. Hence it was considered, on balance, that the algorithm would not have harmed the patient in any of the 2000 incidents analysed.
Fifty-nine per cent of problems would have been corrected, from the perspective of immediate patient safety, by completing the algorithm up to R2, and 62% by using specific antagonists or antidotes for D. Of the remaining 37%, just on 30% are problems with which all anaesthetists are familiar (see Table 4 ). Airway problems make up 12% (laryngospasm, airway obstruction and aspiration/regurgitation), breathing problems 4% (bronchospasm and hypoventilation), and circulatory problems 14% (changes in heart rate (or rhythm) and blood pressure). Although these are common familiar problems, management using simple written protocols would still be desirable.
Just over 6% of the remainder are problems which are somewhat less common and more complex (3% cardiac arrests, 1 % air embolism, 1 % anaphylaxis, 1 % for the remaining desaturations). Written protocols and regular rehearsal of management protocols are definitely desirable for these more complex less common problems. Less than 1 % make up the residuum of the 37%. Written checklists to help with both diagnosis and management are highly desirable for th ese (e.g. malignant hyperthermia, pneumothorax, sepsis, phaeochromocytoma; see Table 5 ).
Because an anaesthetist has been directed to an appropriate sub-algorithm does not necessarily mean that the situation can always be reversed (e.g. an inadvertent drug overdose may be fatal); however, the anaesthetist would at least be doing "the right thing" and should have a very small chance of having "missed" something important.
In 1 in 8 cases, or nearly 13% of the 1301 applicable incidents, the assessors considered that the core algorithm "COVER ABCD" would definitely have led to a quicker and/or better resolution to the problem than the anaesthetist actually achieved (as reported on the AIMS form). A typical case in which the algorithm would have been judged to have done better than the anaesthetist is one in which the anaesthetist did two blood gas analyses to confirm persistent desaturation before considering the possibility of endobronchial intubation. Another was one in which brain death ensued because of failure to diagnose oesophageal intubation.
It is apparent from Table 6 that certain types of incidents were not handled as well by anaesthetists as some other types. The algorithm was considered to have done better than the anaesthetist in 18 (42070) of 44 vaporizer incidents (M4-M6C), in 15 (26070) of 57 common gas outlet incidents (M7-MIO), in 28 (35070) of 81 problems with valves, soda lime and circuit configuration (B3-B4a) and in 35 (25070) of 140 incidents involving endotracheal tubes (Tl-T3).
Thus, it would seem that it would be desirable to teach fault-finding routines to improve performance in these areas. An attempt to do this has been made for the endotracheal tube elsewhere in this symposium. 15 In a similar way, a standard checking routine can be developed for checking all vaporizers.
Also, with obscure ventilation and/or equipment problems it seems that all too often the anaesthetist persisted in using the anaesthetic machine when it was the cause of the problem. Every anaesthetist should be trained to abandon the machine, ventilate by hand, and keep the patient "asleep" with an intravenous agent if another machine is not immediately available.
It is of note that well over half of all the applicable incidents were due to "technical" problems involving equipment, the machine, the breathing circuit or the endotracheal tube. Adverse outcomes arising from these problems are often those for which anaesthetists are "blamed", not least because they are "tightly coupled", i.e. cause and effect relationships may be easy to establish, at least retrospectively. Most are eminently preventable, readily detected and/or amenable to reversal before major physiological insult to the patient with proper checking and use of equipment and the application of this crisis-management algorithm. They can often be traced to specific causes and usually have definitive solutions. Most of the solutions to these problems (M, Band T codes in Table 6 ) are self-evident (e.g. correcting rotameter settings for hypoxic mixtures, or eliminating the machine for oxygen supply failure, rotameter faults, regulator faults, and obscure leaks, ventilator or circuit problems) and are common to all incidents of that type.
However, there were occasional "exceptions to the rule" (see Table 6 ). Most of the leaks at, or prior to, the common gas outlet would have been diagnosed and corrected by hand-ventilation. However, two of these faults (see M09a, Table 6 ) were caused by faulty valves and had to be corrected by removing the machine. Also, one obvious circuit disconnection (see BOla, Table 6 ) was due to the soda-lime canister falling off and disintegrating. Thus, hand-ventilation with the existing circuit would not have sufficed and eliminating the machine or getting a new circuit was required. Five cases of overpressure of the breathing system were resolved by hand-ventilation, but most (14) required eliminating the anaesthetic machine (see T04, Table 6 ). One case of laryngospasm would have been "diagnosed" when it was noted that the vaporizer was empty. By convention, more specific diagnoses always took precedence over less specific ones. Thus, when cardiovascular problems were caused by drugs this more specific diagnosis took precedence over a diagnosis of, for example, bradycardia (39 caused by drugs out of 60 overall) or hypotension (47 caused by drugs out of 75 overall).
At the final meeting in Adelaide each of the criticisms raised at the Sydney meeting was discussed and solutions were proposed. 1: "The algorithm was too complex to remember and practising anaesthetists would resist its adoption." The solution proposed was that the routine "scan" every anaesthetist carries out at five-minute intervals should be conducted according to the "COVER ABCD, A SWIFT CHECK" sequence, with the "A SWIFT CHECK" component taking in the surgeon, wound, operative site and a scan of the patient, tubes, circuit and machine. Several volunteer anaesthetists tried this approach before the Adelaide meeting and were able to report that the COVER sequence rapidly became "second nature". They were able to report that they could rehearse the full action sequence several times a day and that it could also be taught on ordinary cases, as long as care was taken to avoid "awareness". Indeed, people became "slick" very rapidly and could complete it in 30-40 seconds. 2: "That it would be impractical to invoke whenever there was a problem." The meeting adopted the proposal that it was acceptable to invoke the action sequence progressively according to the degree of urgency of the situation or the degree of unease felt by the anaesthetist. If all was normal, the full algorithm would not be acted out, but would be gone through mentally. Thus, if saturation and pulse were normal (Cl and C2), the rotameter and oxygen analyser reading would be inspected (01 and 02), but no adjustments would be made. Likewise, at VI the excursions of the patient's chest, the circuit pressure, capnograph and spirometer would be scanned but, if all was well, handventilation of the lungs would not be carried out. If, however, the anaesthetist was uneasy, he or she could "dial-up" 100!r/o oxygen, check the oxygen analyser, and invoke the whole sequence. 3: "There was 110 place for Cl 'core algorithm:' crisis-,~J)(:,cific algorithms should be developed." It was accepted by the meeting that the fact that as I in 8 anaesthetists did not perform as well as they might have using the algorithm, and as the algorithm should do no harm and was quick and easy to carry out in full, it was reasonable to use it as a "first line of defence". Crisis-specific sub-algorithms and further checklists could then be developed and applied, with little chance of there still being a major problem "upstream" which had been "missed".
4: "The algorithm should be subjected to further validation." The meeting accepted that the validation against the first 2000 AIMS incidents was an adequate test to justify recommending the algorithm for general use. It will continue to be validated against new incident reports and against any anecdotes of particularly difficult situations. If COVER proves counter-productive or harmful in some unusual situations, the anaesthetist would simply have to revert to what he or she would have had to do anyway without the algorithm-work from first principles.
The "technical" and drug problems which represented over 62070 of all the incidents were dealt with well by COVER. Considerable work needs to be done to develop validated, robust sub-algorithms for the remainder, particularly for the 1070 residuum of unusual, complex problems. It is intended to produce simple, easy-to-read protocols for each of the subalgorithms, and for each of the problems listed in the check-list represented by the mnemonic "A SWIFT CHECK" (see Table 5 ). These will be validated against incident reports, tested "in the field" and progressively refined. It would then be highly desirable to use simulator-based methods to test the performance of previously naive trainees who have and who have not been trained in the use of the COVER core algorithm, so that its utility may be validated. 31 The ready availability of simple protocols for each of the "sub-algorithm" situations would serve to educate the anaesthetist, and would prove valuable in real crises. For example, only half the cases of anaphylaxis or of air embolism reported in this symposium '''02 immediately received the "classical" management. It is planned to develop standard protocol manuals with perforated pages so that "cards" can be torn out and handed to team members in complex crises, providing specific instructions as to what their respective responsibilities are. This would constitute an important part of the ongoing management of crises once the initial 1-2 minutes have been handled using COVER. This second phase of crisis management ("Anaesthesia Crisis Resource Management") is analogous to the "Cockpit Resource Management" now taught to airline crews for use if the "Phase I" responses and initial checklists do not solve the problem. 31 Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, 1993 In conclusion, this study suggests that the cnsls management algorithm "COVER ABCD, A SWIFT CHECK" is sufficiently robust and safe to recommend its general use as an initial response to any incident or crisis which occurs when a patient is breathing gas from an anaesthetic machine. It requires a limited knowledge-base and is easily learnt and rehearsed during the anaesthetist's working day. It will provide a functional diagnosis in over 99% of cases and will correct 62% of the problems in 40-60 seconds. In the remaining 37% it will allow the anaesthetist to proceed with a "sub-algorithm" confident in the knowledge that some important step has not been missed, In just over 30% of incidents this will be for a problem familiar to all anaesthetists (e.g. laryngospasm, bradycardia); in just over 6% of the remainder it will be for a less common, more complex, but finite set of problems (3% cardiac arrest, 1% air embolism, 1% anaphylaxis, 1 % for the remaining desaturations); in less than 1 % diagnosis and correction will require a more complex checklist (e.g. for malignant hyperthermia, pneumothorax). Specific sub-algorithms and an approach to "Anaesthesia Crisis Resource Management" need to be developed and validated for more complex ongoing problems; 31 this is in progress. Establish adequacy of peripheral circulation (rate, rhythm and character of pulse). If pulseless institute cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). " The core algorithm must still be completed as soon as possible. Note saturation. Examine for evidence of central cyanosis. Pulse oximetery is superior to clinical detection" and is recommended. n." Test probe on own finger, if necessary, whilst proceeding with 01 and 02. Check rotameter settings, ensure inspired mixture is not hypoxic. Adjust inspired oxygen concentration to 100070 and note that only the oxygen flowmeter is operating.
Check that the oxygen analyser shows a rising oxygen concentration distal to the common gas outlet. Ventilate the lungs by hand to assess breathing circuit integrity, airway patency, chest compliance and air entry by "feel" and careful observation and auscultation. Also inspect capnography trace. Note settings and levels of agents. Check all vaporiser filler ports, seatings and connections for liquid or gas leaks during pressurisation of the system. Consider the possibility of the wrong agent being in the vaporiser. Systematically check the endotracheal tube (if in use). Ensure that it is patent with no leaks or kinks or obstructions (see suggested protocol p. 615). " Check capnograph for tracheal placement" and oximeter for possible endobronchial position. " If necessary adjust, deflate cuff, pass a catheter, or remove and replace. Eliminate the anaesthetic machine and ventilate with self-inflating (e.g. Air Viva) bag with 100070 oxygen (from alternative source if necessary). Retain gas monitor sampling port (but be aware of possible problems). 'w Review all monitors in use. (Preferably oxygen analyser, capnograph, oximeter, blood pressure, electrocardiograph (ECG), temperature and neuromuscular junction monitor). For proper use, the algorithm requires all monitors to have been correctly sited, checked and calibrated. Review all other equiment in contact with or relevant to the patient (e.g. diathermy, humidifiers, heating blankets, endoscopes, probes, prostheses, retractors and other appliances). Check patency of the unintubated airway. Consider laryngospasm or presence of foreign body, blood, gastric contents, nasopharyngeal or bronchial secretions. Assess pattern, adequacy and distribution of ventilation. Consider, examine and auscultate for bronchospasm, pulmonary oedema, lobar collapse and pneumo-or haemothorax. " Repeat evaluation of peripheral perfusion, pulse, blood pressure, ECG and filling pressures (where possible) and any possible obstruction to venous return, raised intrathoracic pressure (e.g. inadvertent PEEP) or direct interference to (e.g. stimulation by central line) or tamponade of the heart. Note any trends on records. Review intended, and consider possible unintended, drug or substance administration. Consider whether the problem may be due to unexpected effect, " a failure of administration or wrong dose, route or manner of administration of an intended or "wrong drug". 20 Review all possible routes of drug administration. " The remainder (see Table 5 ) comprise less than 1% Table 3 ). h. Stage of COVER at which correction would have been made (see text, Table 3 ). i. Sub-algorithm with which the anaesthetist should proceed (see Table 4 ).
